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NOTES
THE PUBLIC'S NEED TO KNOW
VS. EFFECTIVE SETTLEMENT
TECHNIQUES: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT CONFRONTS
THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

With the proliferation of alternative dispute resolution, the summary jury trial2
(SJT) has become popular in many federal courts as an alternative to litigation.
Because of the SJT's trial-like nature, members of the press argue that the first
3

gives the press the right to report on SJT proceedings. In Cincinnati
Gas and Electric Co. v. GeneralElectric Co.,4 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of whether the first amendment right of access attaches to a
amendment

SJT proceeding.
II.

THE CASE

In the early 1980's, the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co., the Dayton Power
and Light Co., and Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company (utilities companies) jointly undertook construction of the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power
Plant in Ohio. 5

The utilities companies filed an action in July of 1984 against
General Electric and Sargent and Lundy Engineers, an architectural and
engineering firm, alleging breach of contractual duties and common law regarding

1. 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub. nom. Cincinnati Post v. General Electric Co.,
109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
2. The 1984 Judicial Conference of the United States Report states: "Resolved, that the Judicial
Conference endorses the experimental use of summary jury trials as a potential effective means of
promoting the fair and equitable settlement of lengthy civil jury trials." Report of the Proceedingsof
the JudicialConference of the United States, 88 (September 17, 1984).
3. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub. nom. Cincinnati Post v. General Electric Co.,
109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989).
5. Id. at 901.
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modifications of the plant. 6 The parties acknowledged early on in the proceedings that the element of confidentiality was essential. 7 Accordingly, on
December 6, 1984, the magistrate approved a comprehensive protective order
8
which ensured as much confidentiality as possible during discovery. Nearly
three years later, the district court, on June 26, 1987, ordered the parties to engage
order also stated that
in a summary jury trial on September 8, 1987. 9 The court's
10
the press and public were barred from the proceeding.
Four days before the summary jury trial was to convene, the Cincinnati Post,
the Dayton Daily News and Journal Herald, the Columbus Dispatch, and The
Cincinnati Enquirer 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the newspapers") moved to
intervene for the 'limited purpose of challenging the order closing the summary
jury trial." 12 The newspapers claimed that the first amendment gave the press
and the public the right of access to the proceedings. 13 On September 14, 1987,
the district court denied the newspapers' motion to intervene. 14 The court
amended its order on October 5, 1987, to (1) restrict communications between
mock jurors and the press and the public until the case had ended, and (2) seal the
list of prospective and actual jurors until litigation had concluded. 15 The court
reasoned that, if identities were disclosed at the present time, it could defeat the
confidentiality aspect the parties had desired to maintain. 16 Less than two
months after the summary jury trial ended, the parties settled. 17 On November
20, 1987, the court approved the terms of the settlement and dismissed the action
with prejudice. 18 However, the court did not dissolve the orders to keep the
transcript and jury list sealed, but allowed all the information to remain confiden-

6. Id. Later, the utilities companies amended their complaint against General Electric to include
RICO and fraud claims.
7. Id.
8. The agreement held that use of the documents were to be limited to 'prosecution or defense
of this action,' or to 'other proceedings arising in connection with the [nuclear] Plant." Id.
9. Id. at 902.
10. This particular provision read, "The proceedings, and all results thereof, shall be confidential,
and shall not be disclosed other than to the parties, their attorneys, consultants and insurers. The jurors
shall be appropriately instructed as to such confidential treatments.' Id.
11. The Enquirer did not join the other newspapers on appeal to the 6th Circuit.
12. At district court, the utilities companies supported the newspapers' attempt to intervene, while
General Electric and Sargent & Lundy opposed it. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric
Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 598 (S.D. Ohio, 1987). However, all the plaintiffs and defendants were named
as appellees on appeal. CincinnatiGas & Electric, 854 F.2d at 900.
13. Cincinnati Gas & Electric, 854 F.2d at 901.
14. The court arranged for the parties to provide it with a sealed transcript of the proceedings in
the event that the newspapers successfully challenge the district court's order. Cincinnati Gas &
Electric, 117 F.R.D. at 598.
15. CincinnatiGas & Electric, 854 F.2d at 902.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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tial indefinitely. 19 The newspapers appealed both of the District Court's final
20
orders.
The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's decision that the first amendment
right of access does not attach to summary jury trial proceedings. 21 The court
based its decision on two factors: (1) it agreed that "'there is no historically
recognized right of access to summary fury trials in that this mechanism has been
in existence for less than a decade;"' 22 and (2) there is no valid public interest
in the "right to know" in the proceedings, since these were private negotiations.23 Thus, the court held, that, where there is a summary jury trial which
the parties agreed would be confidential,
there is no first amendment right of
24
access by the press and public.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Birth of the SJT
The summary jury trial is one of the newest and most innovative types of
alternative dispute resolution. 25 Thomas D. Lambros, Judge for the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, developed the SJT in
198026 in response to the high cost of litigation. 27 In his experiences as a trial
judge, he came upon a number of cases which he believed should have settled
before trial, but did not, because the parties felt they needed to have a jury
evaluate the strengths or weaknesses of their claims.2 8
Lambros envisioned
a settlement technique which would allow parties to have their "day in court"
before a jury, but in a streamlined, summarized form. 29 Lambros describes the
SJT technique as an "effective tool in overcoming the burden of an ever increasing
docket and in reducing juror costs, while not sacrificing
the rights of individuals
"3
who seek justice through our jurisprudential process.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant judges the authority to utilize the
SJT technique. 3 1 In fact, the qualities of the SJT fulfill the requirement that the

19. Id.
20. Id. at 900.
21. Id. at 901.
22. Id. at 903
23. Id. at 905.
24. Id. at 902.
25. For a full treatment of the summary jury trial, see Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial,A Report
to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103
F.R.D. 461 (1984).
26. Id. at 461, 463.
27. Id. at 463.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 468.
30. Id. at 463-64.
31. Id. at 469.
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32

Rules "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
Rule 16 is the cornerstone upon which the SJT and other settlement techniques
rest. The Rule gives the court discretion to hold pre-trial conferences with the
parties to discuss such issues as "expediting the disposition of the action," 33 and
"facilitating the settlement of the case." 34 During these conferences the court
may discuss with the parties the "possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute,"3 5 and "such other matters as may aid in
the disposition of the action." 36 A judge can actually order a summary jury trial
in her discretion. 3 7 Additionally, many local court rules promulgated under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 provide the authority for the SJT. 38 These
court rules, along with the court's "inherent power to manage and control its
docket," 39 seemingly validate the use of the SJT. Further, use of the SJT is not
number of state courts are now experpeculiar to the federal court system, as a 40
imenting with the new settlement device.
The SJT is intended "primarily for cases that will not settle using more
traditional methods," 41 and is usually the final settlement technique employed
before the parties resort to litigation. 42 Judges look upon the SJT favorably for
being able to accelerate case disposition. Judge Arthur Spiegel uses the SJT in all
appropriate cases to help keep his docket open for cases which can be disposed
of only by way of trial.43 He finds the SJT especially appropriate for cases
based on circumstantial evidence rather than credibility of witnesses. 44 Lambros
characterizes complex cases as being the most fitting for the scheme of the SJT,
stating that "the longer the trial, the greater the potential value of the summary
jury proceeding." 45 This is because the parties will save time and money by
avoiding long, drawn-out litigation.
The summary jury trial process begins once the court orders, or the parties
consent, to participate in the procedure. Because the SJT functions in a similar
manner to a regular trial, the parties should complete discovery and prepare as if

32. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.
FED.

R. CIV.
R. Civ.
R. Civ.
R. Civ.
R. Civ.

P.
P.
P.
P.
P.

16(a)(1).
16(a)(5).
16(c)(7).
16(c)(11).
39(c).

38. FED. R. CIv. P. 83.

39. Lambros, supra note 25, at 469.
40. Id. at 476.
41. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial - An Alternative Method of Resolving Disputes, 69
JUDIcATURE, No. 5, 286, 287 (February-March 1986).
42. Lambros, supra note 25, at 463.
43. Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829, 833 (1986.) Spiegel was the trial
judge in the instant case.
44. Id. at 835.
45. Lambros, supra note 41, at 286-87.
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actually going to trial.46 A few weeks before the SJT is held, the judge will
conduct a pre-trial conference to determine the posture of the case. 47 The judge
will resolve problems or concerns regarding the evidence to be presented and the
opinions to be expressed, make sure there are no pending motions, and set
guidelines for the SJT. 48 Finally, counsel must submit49to the court trial briefs
detailing issues of law and proposing jury instructions.
When the SJT commences, six jurors will hear the case.5 ° While the
proceedings are closed to the public, 5 1 the parties must be present unless they
obtain excuse by leave of the court. 52 The attorneys will then present abbreviated versions of their case, usually taking one hour each to make their presentations 53 which are normally broken down into opening statements, presentation
of evidence, and closing arguments. 5 4 No witnesses testify and objections are
usually minimal.5 5 After each attorney has concluded their presentation, the
56
judge gives an abbreviated charge to the jury and excuses them to deliberate.
The jury decides three issues: (1) liability, (2) evaluation of plaintiff's damages,
57
regardless of liability, and (3) which party wins, and the amount of recovery.
The court encourages the jury to reach a unanimous verdict, but "separate,
individual verdicts do afford counsel substantial insight into the individual juror's
perceptions and may suggest an equitable basis for settlement." 58 The parties
may stiulate that the decision will be binding, but normally this stipulation is not
made.
The proceeding "in no way affects the parties' rights to a full trial on
the merits, "6 unless the parties agree the SJT proceedings will be binding.
Once the jurors reach their decision or decisions, they announce them to the court
and the parties. The judge, the attorneys, and the jurors may then engage in posttrial discussion which may "serve as a springboard for meaningful settlement
61
negotiations."
Through the use of a summary jury trial, the parties can begin to see the
strengths and weaknesses, as their case unfolds in a way typically ascertainable

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Spiegel, supra note 43, at 830.
Lambros, supra note 41, at 287.
Lambros, supra note 25, at 470.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 471.
Spiegel, supra note 43, at 831.
Lambros, supra note 25, at 471.
Id.
Spiegel, supra note 43, at 829.
Lambros, supra note 25, at 471.
Id.
Id. at 469.
Lambros, supra note 41, at 289-90.
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only through a more expensive and time-consuming trial. 62 Having had a taste
of how a jury would respond to their cases, the parties are then more willing to
settle their claim out of court. 63 Thus, the SJT fulfills the expectations of
parties who rely on the "American justice system's concept of ventilation,
64
confrontation, and vindication of rights in a structured adversarial system."
Although the summary jury trial has received glowing reports, it has also
been the subject of criticism and controversy. Judge Posner questions whether the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure actually do authorize judges to convene summary
jury trials. 66 He also is uncomfortable with the fact that the government
subsidizes parties using SJT's by paying for juror costs. 6 7 Posner also challenges the effectiveness of the SJT, in terms of resource allocation and the number of
settlement agreements reached through the process. 68
Additionally, one commentator on summary jury trials directly contradicts
69
Lambros in asserting that SJT's may not be appropriate for complex cases.
He opines that the attorneys may either make an "incomplete development of
pertinent facts," or, conversely, "run the risk that the complexity of the case will
result in a massive overload of information to the jurors. "
Despite its
criticisms, however, the summary jury trial continues to grow in use in our judicial
71
systems.
B. The FirstAmendment Right to Access
By its own words, the first amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law

. . .

abridging the freedom of

. .

. the press." 72

In Craig v. Harney,7 3 the

74
United States Supreme Court emphasized that "[a] trial is a public event,"
open to the media. The Court measures the media's right to access by first
determining whether the information is within the public domain. In Estes v.

62. Spiegel, supra note 43, at 833.
63. Lambros, supra note 25, at 469.
64. Spiegel, supra note 43, at 833.
65. Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, Proceedingsof the Judicial
Conference of the United States, at 88 (Sept. 17, 1984).
66. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and OtherMethods ofAlternative DisputeResolution: Some
CautionaryObservations, 53 U. CI. L. REv. 366, 385-86 (1986). It should be noted, however, that
the Seventh Circuit determined in Strandell v. Jackson County, Illinois, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987),
that judges cannot force parties to participate in summary jury trials; rather, they can only suggest the
technique to the parties.
67. Posner, supra note 66, at 372.
68. Id. at 374-85.
69. Maatman, The Future of Summary Jury Trials In Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson
County, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 455, 483 (1988).
70. Id. at 483.
71. Id. at 487.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
73. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
74. Id. at 374.
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Texas,7 5 the Court held that members of the media are "free to report whatever
occurs in open court .... ,76 If information is77available to the public, then it
follows that the media is also entitled to access.
In regard to judiciary proceedings other than trials, however, the boundaries
are much less defined. CincinnatiGas & Electric was the first instance where the
press fought for the right to cover a summary jury trial. In fact, there have not
been a great number of situations where the press has attempted to gain access to
other types of alternative dispute resolution proceedings. However, the Supreme
Court has confronted some cases dealing with the media's first amendment rights
involving non-traditional trial situations.
For instance, in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,78 the Court held that the
press has the right to obtain pre-trial discovery documents. 79 It stated that trial
courts should balance freedom of expression considerations with the "particular
governmental interest involved."80 And in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court,8 1 the Court addressed the issue of whether the press has a qualified first
amendment right of access to obtain the transcript of a criminal preliminary
hearing. Relying on its previous discussion in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S.596 (1982), and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980), Chief Justice Warren Burger developed a two prong test to apply to
first amendment right access cases. First, there must be a "tradition of accessibility" to the type of proceeding in question; and second, a court should consider
"whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
prongs are met, the public and press
particular process in question." 82 If both
83
have a right to attend the proceedings.
In the case before it, the Court examined whether there has been a "tradition
of accessibility" to the criminal preliminary hearings in California. 8 4 The Court
explored the history of the California judicial system and found that this type of
preliminary hearing had traditionally been accessible to the public. 81 The
Court's second question was "whether public access to preliminary hearings as
they are conducted in California plays a significant positive role in the actual
functioning of the process." 86 The Court notes that a criminal preliminary
hearing is a crucial and often final step in the criminal process, and that in many
cases, it may be the only forum where the public could observe the system

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965).
Id. at 541-42.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-495 (1975).
467 U.S. 20 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 32.
478 U.S. 1 (1985).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Itt at 10-11.
I& at 11.
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functioning. 8 7 The Court also points out that the absence of the jury makes the
importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even more significant, since
the presence of a jury serves to ensure fairness. 8 8 Finally, the Court states that
the media's coverage of a criminal preliminary hearing was therapeutic to the
89
public because the community could see how the wheels of justice turned.
The Court concluded from its analysis that public access to the criminal preliminary proceeding did play a "particularly significant positive role in the actual
90
functioning of the process."
IV. THE DECISION
The newspapers in Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. relied on the PressEnterprise decision in arguing that courts must recognize a qualified first
amendment right to access to preliminary judicial proceedings, both criminal and
civil. The newspapers also contended that the SiT would likely be the only place
where the public could "learn about the facts underlying the crucial and burning
public issues which are central to this case." 9 1 General Electric claimed that the
newspapers failed to meet one part of the Press-Enterprisetest, namely, that there
92
be a "historically recognized right of access" to a similar type proceeding.
However, the newspapers countered that they met the more important second
prong of the Press Enterprise test, which requires that public access to the
proceedin§ play a "particularly significant positive role in the actual functioning
process. " 9 They gave three reasons why the summary jury trial proceeding was
such an important process that it should be accessible to the press and public: (1)
the parties were able to stipulate that the verdict would be binding; (2) since the
SJT may produce settlement, the public would never know the issues; and (3)
because the summary jury trial used a judge to preside over a jury94which heard
evidence and rendered a verdict, it functioned like a normal trial.
The trial
court nevertheless denied the newspapers' motion to intervene. 95 The court held
that the newspapers, by their approach, had exalted "form over function," and that
a summary ury trial, despite all its similarities to a normal trial, was a settlement
technique.9 The court also rejected the newspapers' contentions that the SJT
played a significant role in the functioning process, noting that "the proceeding is
non-binding and has no effect on the merits of the case, other than to promote

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 12-13.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 11.
Cincinnati Gas & Electric, 117 F.R.D. at 598.
Id.
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 603.
ld. at 600.
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settlement." 9 7 The trial judge also "emphasized that the summary jury trial was
conducted with the 'cooperation of the parties' and that his order in closing the
summary jury trial was in response to General9 8Electric's substantial concerns
regarding the potential lack of confidentiality."
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the newspapers
had no first amendment right of access to the summary jury trial. 99 It found that
the newspapers could not satisfy either prong of the Press-Enterprisetest. First,
it concluded that there is no tradition whatsoever of allowing the media to cover
SJT's since their inception in 1980.100 The court held that, regardless of how
similar the SJT looked to a normal trial, it was nonetheless a settlement technique
between two private parties, 10 1 and traditionally, the press is barred from access
to settlement proceedings between private parties. 10 Second, the court could
see no significant positive role media coverage could provide in this situation. 103 If the parties were concerned about confidentiality, they may be
unwilling to settle if the technique to be used did not provide for confidentiality.104 Therefore, the court concluded, allowing publicity of the SJT pro10 5
ceedings would hinder the government's interest in encouraging settlements.
Additionally, the court rejects the newspapers' claim that the public had a
"right to know" about the SJT proceedings between the utilities companies and
General Electric and the architectural firm. 106 It points out that the public
would not have access to "observe any negotiations leading to a traditional
under no constitutional
settlement of the case . . . and the parties would be
10 7
obligation to reveal the content of the negotiations."
Finally, on appeal the newspapers attempted to analogize the situation found
in Press-Enterprisewith the instant case to contend that the "facilitation of a
settlement between the parties has a final and decisive effect on the outcome of
the litigation." 108 The court flatly disagrees, noting that the pre-trial proceeding
in Press-Enterprise "definitely affected the rights of the parties," while the
1 9
outcome of the SJT would not have any binding effect upon the parties. 0
Moreover, the court emphasizes that "it is the presence of the existence of a

97. Id. at 602.
98. Id.
99. 854 F.2d at 900.

100. Id. at 903.
101. Id. at 904.
102. Id. at 903.
103. Id. at 904.
104. Id.
105. 1d.
106. Id. at 905.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. This is true unless the parties had stipulated beforehand that the decision would be
binding, which they did not.
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court's coercive powers that is the touchstone of the recognized right to access,
not the presence110of a procedure that might lead the parties to voluntarily terminate
the litigation."
Judge Edwards filed a terse, separate opinion from the majority. While
agreeing with the majority that a SJT is not required to be open to the public, he
on the newspapers'
maintained that a permanent sealing of the record infringed
1 1
I
know.
to
right
public's
the
and
rights,
first amendment
V. ANALYSIS
As noted earlier, the CincinnatiGas & Electric court did not have any case
law directly on point to follow. However, the court applied the two-prong test of
Press-Enterpriseto guide its decision-making.
A. Tradition of Access
Because there is very little tradition to consider regarding the SJT (it is still
less than 10 years old), the court had little precedent to consider in applying the
first prong of the test. The only analogous situations the court could find to
compare with the SJT were criminal proceedings. In fact, the two-prong test the
Sixth Circuit applied was developed by the Supreme Court while deciding a
criminal preliminary hearing issue in Press-Enterprise. Criminal proceedings
cases are easy to distinguish from the situation in CincinnatiGas & Electric. As
the Supreme Court notes in Press-Enterprise,there is a strong tradition of
allowing access to criminal trials and hearings. 112 The policy behind granting
the public access to criminal proceedings is to allow citizens to see justice
functioning, when the state has brought a charge against a criminal. 113 Finally,
if the "State" or the "People" have brought the charge against the defendant, the
citizens should have the right to attend the proceedings.
Conversely, during its short history there has been no tradition of access to
the summary jury trial. The SJT is a settlement technique used for civil actions
between two private parties which can hardly be compared to a criminal
proceeding. Although the newspapers argued that the public had great concern
over a nuclear power plant in their community, the suit primarily involved a
contract dispute between two private parties. The utilities com anies also claimed
RICO violations by General Electric and Sargent & Lundy, 114 but these claims
apparently never materialized since there is no record of criminal charges being
brought against the defendants. Had General Electric and Sargent & Lundy been
involved in criminal litigation, the public would have almost certainly had access

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

IdM
Id.
Press-Enterprise,478 U.S. at 10-11.
ld. at 13.
CincinnatiGas & Electric, 854 F.2d at 901.
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to those proceedings. 115 However, this was a civil action in which the parties
decided to attempt a settlement before going to court, and maintained they had a
right to confidential proceedings.
The Cincinnati Gas & Electric court notes that "settlement techniques have
historically been closed to the press and public." 1 16 However, limited instances
exist where a court has allowed the press and public access to negotiation
conferences. In Combined Communications Corporationsv. Finesilver,1 17 a
television station exercised its right under the first amendment to be present at a
federal courthouse during negotiations to settle a lawsuit involving a congressional
redistricting plan. 118 In that case, five registered voters in Colorado had
brought suit against their governor and other government officials for failing 119
to
work out a new redistricting plan for Colorado's Congressional districts.
The district judge ordered the governor and members of the legislature to meet to
work out a compromise. While the judge would not allow a local television
station to bring its cameras into the courtroom during the negotiations, the court
stated without discussion that the television station and members of the public
were allowed to attend the proceedings. 12 ° Most likely, the court's reasoning
for allowing the public access was that governmental entities were involved,
making the negotiations a public event.
In Society of ProfessionalJournalists v. Briggs,12 1 a group of journalists
successfully sued to obtain a copy of a settlement agreement in a law suit
involving "alleged wrongdoing by public officials."
That case, however,
hinged on the court's ruling that the settlement agreement was a public document,
because the suit involved public entities. 123 The common thread for courts
granting the media access seems to be that government entities were involved.
The Professional Journalists court emphasized that the "core of the First
Amendment is access to information about the operation and functioning of
1 24
government."
In Cincinnati Gas & Electric, there were no government agencies directly
involved, yet the subject matter of the suit, a nuclear power plant, was, and
continues to be, of vital interest to the public. Had General Electric been guilty

115. The Supreme Court stated in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573
(1980), that "a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system
of justice." Also, as noted earlier, Press-Enterprisedecided that the public's right of access attaches
at criminal preliminary proceedings as well. Press-Enterprise,478 U.S. at 10-11.
116. CincinnatiGas & Electric, 854 F.2d at 903.
117. 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982).
118. Id. at 819.
119. Id. at 820.
120. Id. at 820-21.
121. 675 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Utah 1987).
122. Id. at 1309.
123. Id. at 1310.
124. Id. at 1309 (referring to Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 583-84 (1980)).
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of violating health or environmental laws, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or
the Environmental Protection Agency would have brought an action, not the
utilities companies. In that situation, the public would most certainly have had a
right of access to the proceedings, since a government agency was involved.
However, since CincinnatiGas & Electric involved neither a criminal proceeding
nor a governmental entity as a party, the public policy of facilitating the settlement
process between private parties outweighed the public's alleged "right to know."

B. Significant Positive Role
The CincinnatiGas & Electric court did not see any significant positive role
in the functioning of summary jury trials by allowing the newspapers to obtain the
SJT transcript. The parties in this case had a grave concern over confidentiality,
and the trial judge willingly obliged to provide closed proceedings and protective
orders. This reasoning may seem not to make sense at first glance: If the parties
refuse to resolve their dispute through an SJT because media coverage is allowed,
they will certainly lose elements of confidentiality anyway if they choose to go to
the public forum of a regular trial. However, the trial judge's position is more
understandable from the government's point of view. The government has a vital
interest in facilitating suits as quickly as possible. If parties are not able to settle
out of court, their case will add another burden to the crowded docket. Hence, the
second prong of the Press-Enterprise test is intended more for the judicial
system's benefit than parties' privacy interests. Therefore, the trial court's and
Sixth Circuit's deference for and protection of extrajudicial settlement techniques
seems valid.
Especially in cases where confidentiality is a vital element, allowing press
coverage could very well hinder open, meaningful SJTs. Media access may cause
parties to view the SJT more like a trial, and to decide to forego a duplicative
settlement technique in lieu of actual litigation. If this happens, the philosophy of
the SJT may be short-circuited, and parties may be less willing to be involved in
one. Even though the press and public may have a legitimate concern in the
substance of SJT proceedings, this does not override the concern to promote
settlements before the cases further burden the already crowded court dockets.
Therefore, it is difficult to see how the press's involvement in an SJT would play
a significant positive role in our judicial process.
i Had the parties in CincinnatiGas & Electric agreed to be bound by the jury's
verdict in the SJT, the media would have had a more compelling argument for
gaining access. Stipulation to a binding decision would seem to bring a
proceeding closer to a trial on the merits. It would follow, then, that if the public
has a right of access to a trial on the merits, it should also have a right of access
to a settlement technique by which the parties have agreed to be bound.
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In his dissent, Judge Edwards said that leaving the records closed indefinitely
conflicted with the first amendment. 125 He agrees with the majority that the
parties' desire for confidentiality should be respected during the SJT.12 6 But
once the once the parties have worked out a settlement, he could see no reason for
keeping the record closed indefinitely. 127 Judge Edwards seems to be ignoring
the fact that settlement terms between private parties are not open to the
public, 128regardless of how interesting or important the subject matter is to the
public. He was persuaded that the alleged "right to know" interest outweighed the
government's policy of encouraging parties to settle disputes in a confidential
setting. If Judge Edwards' opinion were followed, however, fewer parties would
be willing to try to settle through means of the SJT, knowing they would be
deprived of post-settlement confidentiality. This could cut down the technique's
effectiveness in unclogging court dockets.
As Posner points out,1 9 another valid consideration is that public funds are
used to subsidize a private settlement process. 130 Indeed, one could argue that,
since the SJT involves a judge and jury paid with tax dollars, the public and press
have the right to attend the proceedings. This argument fails, however, when one
remembers that the entire judiciary system has been set up to resolve disputes, and
that tax dollars are used in many other ways besides financing actual trials. For
instance, the trial judge who stops a lopsided trial in its early stages and calls
counsel into his or her chambers to encourage a settlement is using the public
treasury just as much as when she resides during the trial. The parties who have
been permitted to use an empty room in the courthouse for a last-minute
settlement effort before trial are using as much electricity as the parties putting on
their case in the next room. The public and press would not have a right to barge
into court chambers or the private meeting room simply because tax dollars were
being used to "subsidize" the parties' settlement attempts. Therefore, the amount
of public expenses used to conduct an SJT is not a valid indicator of whether the
media has access to the proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in CincinnatiGas & Electric decided that the press does not have
a first amendment right of access to summary jury trials. The court found that
there was neither a tradition of accessibility to the process, nor was there a
significant positive function of allowing the press access. The government's

125. 854 F.2d at 905.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. The majority had quoted from Palmieriv. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 865 (2nd Cit. 1985):
"[s]ecrecy of settlement terms ... is a well-established American litigation practice . . ." (citations
omitted). Cincinnati Gas & Electric, 854 F.2d at 903.
129. See Posner, supra note 66.
130. Of course, the parties still have to bear the cost of attorney's fees.
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concern for expediting and encouraging settlements seemed to be the driving force
behind the court's decision. The Supreme Court has tacitly given its approval to
the Sixth Circuit's holding by denying certiori in the case. For the time being,
though, the other federal circuits still have the freedom to decide an SJT access
case differently, if given the opportunity. However, the Sixth Circuit's holding is
correct when considering the settlement process: Settlement can only be effective
when shrouded in terms of secrecy. If courts grant the public access to summary
jury trials simply because their subject matter interests the public, the technique
will lose its effectiveness in facilitating out of court resolutions. Hence, even
though the media may have a strong interest in covering summary jury trials, the
Sixth Circuit has set a precedent that the SJT is a settlement process between
private parties, and cannot be considered as litigation for first amendment
purposes.
ANNE E. BILLINGS
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